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Disadvantageous syndicates

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  • Postlewaite, Andrew
  • Rosenthal, Robert W.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGD7P-14R/2/3a8e7e5a267d03ff885b17820da8b665
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (1974)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 324-326

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:9:y:1974:i:3:p:324-326

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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  1. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
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Cited by:
  1. S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
  2. Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2013. "Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 208-228, 04.
  3. O. Tejada and M. Alvarez-Mozos, 2012. "Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets," Working Papers in Economics 283, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  4. Peter Knudsen & Lars Østerdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
  5. BLOCH, Francis & GHOSAL, Sayantan, 1994. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers 1994056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. H. Michener & Daniel Myers, 1998. "An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 37-82, August.
  7. Okuno, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1980. "Oligopoly and Competition in Large Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 22-31, March.

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