AbstractBoth noncooperative and cooperative game theory have been applied to business strategy. We propose a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative game model, which we call a biform game. This is designed to formalize the notion of business strategy as making moves to try to shape the competitive environment in a favorable way. (The noncooperative component of a biform game models the strategic moves. The cooperative component models the resulting competitive environment.) We give biform models of various well-known business strategies. We prove general results on when a business strategy, modelled as a biform game, will be efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.
Volume (Year): 53 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
noncooperative game; efficiency; business strategy; cooperative game;
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