Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies
AbstractWe prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853–860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 48 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Coalition production economy; Transferable utility game; Core; Coalition formation; Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z.F., 2004.
"Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game,"
2004-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
- Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Working Papers 358, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Sondermann, Dieter, 1974. "Economies of scale and equilibria in coalition production economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 259-291, July.
- Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1977. "Coalition Structure in a Labor-Managed Market Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 341-60, March.
- Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Existence and Optimality of Equilibrium in Labour-managed Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 419-33, July.
- Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 429-36, July.
- Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Working Papers 430, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
- Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
- Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 143-48, February.
- Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.