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The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem

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  • Qin, Cheng-Zhong
  • Shapley, Lloyd S.
  • Shimomura, Ken-Ichi

Abstract

The Walras core of an economy is the set of allocations that are attainable for the consumers when their trades are constrained to be based on some agreed set of prices, and such that no alternative price system exists for any sub-coalition that allows all members to trade to something better. As compared with the Edgeworth core, both coalitional improvements and being a candidate allocation for the Walras core become harder. The Walras core may even contain allocations that violate the usual Pareto effciency. Nevertheless, the competitive allocations are the same under the two theories, and the equal-treatment Walras core allocations converge under general conditions to the competitive allocations in the process of replication.
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  • Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006. "The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 180-197, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:2:p:180-197
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2014. "Trade through endogenous intermediaries," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 262-268.
    2. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    3. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Nicholas Ziros, 2006. "A three way equivalence," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0634, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C. & Ziros, Nicholas, 2008. "A three way equivalence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 380-391, March.

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