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The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem

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  • Qin, Cheng-Zhong
  • Shapley, Lloyd S.
  • Shimomura, Ken-Ichi

Abstract

The Walras core of an economy is the set of allocations that are attainable for the consumers when their trades are constrained to be based on some agreed set of prices, and such that no alternative price system exists for any sub-coalition that allows all members to trade to something better. As compared with the Edgeworth core, both coalitional improvements and being a candidate allocation for the Walras core become harder. The Walras core may even contain allocations that violate the usual Pareto effciency. Nevertheless, the competitive allocations are the same under the two theories, and the equal-treatment Walras core allocations converge under general conditions to the competitive allocations in the process of replication.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 180-197

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:2:p:180-197

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Grodal, Birgit, 1975. "The rate of convergence of the core for a purely competitive sequence of economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 171-186.
  2. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
  3. Cheng, Hsueh-Cheng, 1981. "What Is the Normal Rate of Convergence of the Core? (Part I)," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 73-83, January.
  4. Debreu, Gerard, 1975. "The rate of convergence of the core of an economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-7, March.
  5. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 335-44.
  6. Cheng, Hsueh-Cheng, 1982. "Generic Examples of the Rate of Convergence of the Core," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 309-21, June.
  7. Aumann, Robert J, 1979. "On the Rate of Convergence of the Core," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(2), pages 349-57, June.
  8. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
  2. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and & Nicholas Ziros, 2006. "A three way equivalence," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0634, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  3. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2014. "Trade through endogenous intermediaries," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 262-268.
  4. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C. & Ziros, Nicholas, 2008. "A three way equivalence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 380-391, March.
  5. Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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