Disadvantageous Syndicates
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 40.Length:
Date of creation: Mar 1973
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:40
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974. "Disadvantageous syndicates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik & Koutsougeras, L., 2007.
"Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core,"
Working Papers in Economics
04/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
- S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- S D Flåm & L Koutsougeras, 2005. "Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0512, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- O. Tejada and M. Alvarez-Mozos, 2012. "Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets," Working Papers in Economics 283, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- H. Michener & Daniel Myers, 1998. "An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 37-82, August.
- Okuno, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1980.
"Oligopoly and Competition in Large Markets,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 22-31, March.
- Masahiro Okuno, 1977. "Oligopoly and Competition in Large Markets," Discussion Papers 305, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- BLOCH, Francis & GHOSAL, Sayantan, 1994.
"Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bloch, Francis & Ghosal, Sayantan, 1997. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 368-384, June.
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