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Avoiding the Pitfalls of Net Uniformity: Zero Rating and Nondiscrimination

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  • Christopher S. Yoo

    (University of Pennsylvania Law School)

Abstract

The current debate over network neutrality has not fully appreciated how service differentiation can benefit consumers and promote Internet adoption. On the demand-side, service differentiation addresses the primary obstacle to adoption, which is the lack of perceived need for Internet service, and reflects the growing heterogeneity of consumer demand. On the supply-side, monopolistic competition has long underscored how product differentiation can create stable equilibria with multiple providers—notwithstanding the presence of unexhausted economies of scale—by allowing competitors to target subsegments of the overall market that place a higher value on particular services. Conversely, prohibiting service differentiation would restrict competition to price and network size, which are factors that favor the largest players. These dynamics are well illustrated by global enforcement patterns with respect to a practice known as “zero rating”, which permits subscribers to access certain content without having that traffic count against their data caps. Of the six countries that have brought enforcement actions against zero rating, only India has categorically banned the practice. The other five countries (the United States, Chile, Canada, Slovenia, and The Netherlands) have adopted a more nuanced approach. A case-by-case approach is consistent with the empirical literature on vertical integration and restraints and the well-established principles for determining when to impose per se illegality and when to apply the “rule of reason”. The U.S. Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence also helps identify factors that militate against liability, such as the lack of market power, nonexclusivity, and nonproprietary services.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher S. Yoo, 2017. "Avoiding the Pitfalls of Net Uniformity: Zero Rating and Nondiscrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 509-536, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:50:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-016-9555-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-016-9555-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2021. "Effects of Vertical Integration on Internet Service Providers' Zero-rating Choice," MPRA Paper 110288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2022. "Effects of vertical integration on internet service providers’ zero-rating choice," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    3. Hooton, Christopher Alex, 2020. "Testing the economics of the net neutrality debate," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(5).
    4. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2020. "Effects of Content Providers' Heterogeneity on Internet Service Providers' Zero-rating Choice," MPRA Paper 107505, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2021.
    5. Gerpott, Torsten J., 2018. "Zero-rating arrangements of mobile Internet access service providers – An analysis of main factors shaping the need for regulatory interventions," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 489-500.
    6. Hoernig, Steffen & Monteiro, Francisco, 2020. "Zero-rating and network effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    7. Steffen Hoernig; Francisco Monteiro, 2018. "Zero-rating, network effects, and capacity investments," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp627, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.

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