The geographic distribution of environmental inspections
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Enforcement; Inspections; Warnings; Petroleum storage regulations; Transportation costs; K4; Q2;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heyes, Anthony, 2002. "A Theory of Filtered Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 34-46, January.
- Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, 09.
- Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.
- Heyes, Anthony G, 1998. "Making Things Stick: Enforcement and Compliance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 50-63, Winter.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Mark Raymond, 2004. "Regulatory Compliance with Costly and Uncertain Litigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 165-176, 09.
- Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
- Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
- Kang, Sang Mok & Lee, Myunghun, 2004. "An empirical study on effective pollution enforcement in Korea," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(03), pages 353-365, July.
- Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July.
- Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July.
- Holstein, Fredrik & Gren, Ing-Marie, 2013. "Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden: Economic motives, environmental attitudes, and social capital," Working Paper Series 2013:3, Department Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
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