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Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle

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  • Peter Fishburn
  • William Gehrlein

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  • Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein, 1976. "Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 79-88, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:28:y:1976:i:1:p:79-88
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718459
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
    2. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier, 2017. "Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-861, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2018.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    3. Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2020. "The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 363-395, March.
    4. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016. "Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 11-22.
    5. Zachary F. Lansdowne, 1996. "Ordinal ranking methods for multicriterion decision making," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(5), pages 613-627, August.
    6. Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 151-185, April.
    7. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    8. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    9. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
    10. Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2019. "Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 51-95, April.
    11. Yoko Kawada, 2018. "Cosine similarity and the Borda rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 1-11, June.
    12. Paolo Viappiani, 2024. "Volumetric Aggregation Methods for Scoring Rules with Unknown Weights," Post-Print hal-04440153, HAL.
    13. Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.
    14. Mostapha Diss & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "Another perspective on Borda’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 99-121, January.
    15. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2018. "An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 53-79, June.
    16. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
    17. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2017. "Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population," MPRA Paper 78093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 299-311, August.
    19. Toyotaka Sakai, 2015. "A Search for the General Will in a Spatial Model," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 260-270, June.
    20. Paolo Viappiani, 2020. "Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(3), pages 323-367, April.
    21. Michel Breton & Karine Straeten, 2015. "Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules: a new look at the Penrose formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 103-122, October.

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