War as Rent-Seeking: A Public Choice Perspective on the Pacific War
AbstractHistorical literature on the causes of the Pacific War generally focuses on either international relationships between the great powers in the interwar period or on the role of domestic interest groups in Japan, especially the Imperial Army and Navy. An alternative to these predominantly narrative approaches is to consider Japanese imperialism as explained by the public choice concept of rent seeking. Seeing both imperial expansions through armed conquest and domestic interest group rivalry as forms of rent-seeking behavior can provide a unifying perspective for understanding the Pacific War. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Organization Review.
Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106610
Imperialism; Interest groups; Pacific war; Public choice; Rent seeking; H0; H41; K4; N0; N45; O0;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- N0 - Economic History - - General
- N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
- O0 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - General
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