Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry
AbstractThis paper empirically investigates market behavior and firmsÂ´ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a destable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
Volume (Year): 12 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724
collusion; lobbying; price caps; regulation; rent-seeking; interest groups; telecommunications; D72; L13; L51; L96; C31;
Other versions of this item:
- Astrid Jung & Tomaso Duso, 2003. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-16, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Astrid Jung & Tomaso Duso, 2004. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers 0402, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
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