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The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics George Warskett
Stanley Winer
Walter Hettich
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We explore the nature of tax complexity in competitive political systems. The analysis does not rely upon imperfections in the operation of the public sector. Complexity arises in the course of the struggle for office, during which political parties are induced to propose platforms that discriminate carefully among heterogeneous voters. A basic model is enriched by the addition of administration costs and self-selection, factors which limit the ability of any government to discriminate fully. The effect on complexity of inequalities in political influence is also investigated. The analysis suggests that simple tax systems (such as a flat tax or a broadly based tax without special provisions) are not compatible with vigorous political competition. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance .
Volume (Year): 5 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 123-151
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:5:y:1998:i:2:p:123-151Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Taxation ; Tax complexity ; Administration costs ; Self-selection ; Probabilistic voting ; Flat tax ; Other versions of this item:
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Claudio Agostini, 2004.
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Kelly D. Edmiston & Shannon Mudd & Neven T. Valev, 2004.
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Alberto Sole Olle, 1998.
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