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A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections

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  • James Enelow
  • Melvin Hinich

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a general probabilistic spatial theory of elections and examine sufficient conditions for equilibrium in two-candidate contests with expected vote-maximizing candidates. Given strict concavity of the candidate objective function, a unique equilibrium exists and the candidates adopt the same set of policy positions. Prospective uncertainty, reduced policy salience, degree of concavity of voter utility functions, some degree of centrality in the feasible set of policy locations, and restrictions on the dimensionality of the policy space are all stabilizing factors in two-candidate elections. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 61 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 101-113

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:2:p:101-113

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
  2. Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October.
  3. Assar Lindbeck & J├Ârgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  4. Peter Coughlin, 1986. "Elections and income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 27-91, January.
  5. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomas E. Borcherding & J. Stephen Ferris & Andrea Garzoni, 2001. "Growth in the Real Size of Government Since 1970," Carleton Economic Papers 01-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  2. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  3. Dotti, Valerio, 2014. "The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods," MPRA Paper 54026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Stanley L. Winer & J Stephen Ferris, 2003. "Searching for Keynes: An Essay on the Political Economy of Fiscal Policy, with Application to Canada, 1870-2000 - revised version," CESifo Working Paper Series 1016, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. George Tridimas & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "A Contribution to the Political Economy of Government Size: 'Demand', 'Supply' and 'Political Influence'," Carleton Economic Papers 04-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  6. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
  7. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2004.
  8. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  9. Jan K. Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2013. "Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 4233, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Winer, Stanley L. & Ferris, J. Stephen, 2008. "Searching for Keynesianism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 294-316, June.
  11. George Warskett & Stanley Winer & Walter Hettich, 1998. "The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 123-151, May.
  12. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
  13. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
  14. Robert Baumann & Justin Svec, 2013. "The Impact of Political Uncertainty: A Robust Control Approach," Working Papers 1306, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  15. Dolmas, Jim, 2014. "Almost orthogonal outcomes under probabilistic voting: A cautionary example," MPRA Paper 53628, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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