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Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency

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Author Info
Evrenk, Haldun () (Suffolk University, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

I study political competition between two candidates who could differ in their ability, popularity, and ethics. In elections, each candidate proposes a flat (income) tax rate and a public good level. A high(er)-ability candidate can produce the public good using less funds. Collected taxes that are not used in public goods production are stolen by the elected politician. The voting decision is probabilistic; it depends on a candidate's fiscal policy and his popularity. I prove that the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists and that there are at most two separate equilibria. I also provide a fully solved example.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-4.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 25 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-4

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Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html
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Related research
Keywords: Political Agency; Political Corruption; Nash Equilibrium;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms," Working Papers 2008-5, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. George Warskett & Stanley Winer & Walter Hettich, 1998. "The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 123-151, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 114-133, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption," Working Papers 2008-3, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms," Working Papers 2008-5, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption," Working Papers 2008-3, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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