IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/iaecre/v3y1997i1p91-11210.1007-bf02295004.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Selection criteria and the award procedure in public procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Dimitri Mardas
  • Dimitri Triantafyllou

Abstract

This paper examines the admissibility of some selection criteria in the light of European public procurement law. It also points out the opportunity of using such criteria through an economic analysis. The main aspect to be dealt with is the numerical selection criteria, which may hinder firms not fulfilling them from participating in the award procedure. These criteria refer, according to the European Union directives on public procurement, to the economic, financial, and technical capacity of the candidate firms. In our analysis, the legal appreciation should be confronted with an economic analysis of the numerical selection criteria. This analysis is based on an arithmetic approach which focuses on relative rather than absolute values. Thus, through a series of performance indicators, an alternative approach to the above criteria is presented. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 1997

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitri Mardas & Dimitri Triantafyllou, 1997. "Selection criteria and the award procedure in public procurement," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 3(1), pages 91-112, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:91-112:10.1007/bf02295004
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02295004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02295004
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF02295004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Balassa, Bela, 1986. "The Determinants of Intra-industry Specialization in United States Trade," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 220-233, July.
    2. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
    4. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hansson, Lisa, 2010. "Solving procurement problems in public transport: Examining multi-principal roles in relation to effective control mechanisms," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 124-132.
    2. Hansson Lisa, 2012. "The Private Whistleblower: Defining a New Role in the Public Procurement System," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-28, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Branco, Fernando, 2002. "Procurement favouritism and technology adoption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-91, January.
    2. Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum & Juan-José Ganuza, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021_09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    3. Chiara Carboni & Elisabetta Iossa & Gianpiero Mattera, 2018. "Barriers towards foreign firms in international public procurement markets: a review," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 85-107, March.
    4. Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2014. "Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 252-262.
    5. Chiara Carboni & Elisabetta Iossa & Gianpiero Mattera, 2017. "Barriers to Public Procurement: A Review and Recent Patterns in the EU," IEFE Working Papers 92, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 645-657, August.
    7. Dimitri Mardas, 1999. "Tendering procedures and buy-national policies," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 5(2), pages 189-203, May.
    8. Vagstad, Steinar, 2000. "Centralized vs. decentralized procurement: Does dispersed information call for decentralized decision-making?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 949-963, August.
    9. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    10. Klênio de Souza Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2011. "Competition for Local Public Services with Learning-by-doing and Transferability," Working Papers 06-2011, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    11. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
    12. Evenett, Simon J. & Hoekman, Bernard M., 2005. "Government procurement: market access, transparency, and multilateral trade rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 163-183, March.
    13. Ganuza, Juan-Jose & Hauk, Esther, 2004. "Economic integration and corruption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1463-1484, December.
    14. Constantino Hevia & Martin Gonzalez‐Rozada & Martin Sola & Fabio Spagnolo, 2015. "Estimating and Forecasting the Yield Curve Using A Markov Switching Dynamic Nelson and Siegel Model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(6), pages 987-1009, September.
    15. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2018. "Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    16. Anirudh Shingal, 2015. "Econometric Analyses of Home Bias in Government Procurement," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 188-219, February.
    17. Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    18. Lela Mélon, 2020. "More Than a Nudge? Arguments and Tools for Mandating Green Public Procurement in the EU," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-24, January.
    19. Ragoussis, Alexandros, 2016. "Government agoraphobia: home bias in developing country procurement markets," IDOS Discussion Papers 5/2016, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    20. Brulhart, Marius & Trionfetti, Federico, 2004. "Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 851-881, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:91-112:10.1007/bf02295004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.