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Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules

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Author Info
Evenett, Simon J
Hoekman, Bernard

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Abstract

The effects on national welfare and on market access of two public procurement practices, discrimination and non-transparency, are examined. Both policies have become prominent in international trade negotiations, such as the ongoing Doha Round of WTO trade talks. Our analysis shows that fostering either domestic competition or transparency in state contracting tends to improve welfare. In contrast, we find no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving transparency. This mismatch between market access and welfare effects may account for the slower progress in negotiating procurement disciplines in trade agreements than for traditional border measures such as tariffs.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4109.

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Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4109

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Related research
Keywords: Doha Round; government procurement; market access; WTO;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  3. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 1995. "Are discriminatory procurement policies motivated by protectionism ?," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1995-10, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
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  4. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Miyagiwa, Kaz, 1991. "Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1320-28, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Federico Trionfetti, 2000. "Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 57-76, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 1997. "Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 179, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rod Falvey & Annamaria La Chimia & Oliver Morrissey & Evious Zgovu, . "Competition Policy and Public Procurement in Developing Countries," Discussion Papers 08/07, University of Nottingham, CREDIT. [Downloadable!]
  2. Evenett, Simon J. & Hoekman, Bernard M., 2005. "International cooperation and the reform of public procurement policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3720, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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