Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions
AbstractWe develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a â€œsafe havenâ€) that provides agent-specific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter the auction receive independently-drawn private signals that provide unbiased estimates of the common value. The auctioned item is allocated to the high bidder at a price that is equal to the high bid. Thus the market is a first-price sealed-bid common value auction with endogenous determination of market size. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
auctions; bidding theory; market equilibrium; experimental economics;
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