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It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

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  • Antonio Cabrales

    ()

  • Rosemarie Nagel

    ()

  • José Rodríguez Mora

    ()

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 278-308

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:2:p:278-308

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: Redistribution; Political equilibrium; Voting; Multiple equilibria; Experiments; C72; C92; D72; E24; H24; I31; O38;

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References

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  1. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2004. "Fairness and Redistribution," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, 2010. "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1540-1566.
  3. Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
  5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  6. Hassler, John & Mora, José V Rodríguez & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2001. "The Survival of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
  8. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
  9. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1995. "The Welfare State and Economic Performance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(2), pages 171-98, June.
  10. Arthur Schram, 2005. "Artificiality: The tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 225-237.
  11. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  12. Orazio Attanasio & James Banks & Sarah Tanner, 1998. "Asset holding and consumption volatility," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W98/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  13. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Why people vote: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 417-442, August.
  14. Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  15. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  16. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kocher, Martin G. & Putterman, Louis & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 32-51.
  2. Anke Gerber & Andreas Nicklisch & Stefan Voigt, 2013. "Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4423, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Oechssler, Jörg, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with social preferences," Working Papers 0515, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  4. Claudia M. Buch & Christoph Engel, 2012. "The Tradeoff Between Redistribution and Effort: Evidence from the Field and from the Lab," CESifo Working Paper Series 3808, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Claudia M. Buch & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Effort and Redistribution: Better Cousins Than One Might Have Thought," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Sep 2014.

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