An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowing Out Hypothesis when Taxation Is Endogenous
AbstractAndreoni (1993) has shown in an experimental study that crowding out is incomplete when an involuntary lump-sum tax is levied exogenously on individuals to finance the provision of a public good. In this paper, we (i) replicate Andreoni's experimental conditions, and (ii) introduce treatments where subjects vote on a tax, which is (iii) either below or above the Nash equilibrium. We find almost complete crowding out with exogenous taxation. Voting behavior with respect to the tax in the endogenous treatment has high predictive power for voluntary contributions, but only when voting on a tax that is below the Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 60 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games,"
2006-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IEW - Working Papers 299, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Research Memoranda 029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1794, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IZA Discussion Papers 2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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