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Political entrepreneurship and the formation of special districts

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  • Alexander Fink
  • Richard Wagner

Abstract

Where general purpose governments provide a bundle of services within their boundaries, special district governments provide specific services inside the boundaries of general purpose governments. The alternative to forming a special purpose government is providing the service within a general purpose government. Formation of a special district represents the establishment of a new political enterprise, in contrast to the addition of a new product line to an existing government. We explore the formation of special districts as a particular form of the universal entrepreneurial search for gain or profit from exchange. Political entrepreneurship, like market entrepreneurship, operates inside some framework of rules, and the formation of special districts reflects the search for political gain within that framework of rules. We use an entrepreneurial framework to formulate several hypotheses concerning the formation and organization of special districts. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Fink & Richard Wagner, 2013. "Political entrepreneurship and the formation of special districts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 427-439, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:3:p:427-439
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9216-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Virgil Henry Storr & Stefanie Haeffele & Jordan K. Lofthouse & Anne Hobson, 2022. "Entrepreneurship during a pandemic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 83-105, August.
    2. Pengju Zhang, 2018. "The unintended impact of tax and expenditure limitations on the use of special districts: the politics of circumvention," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 21-50, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Special districts; Political entrepreneurship; Public enterprise; Public–private interaction; Enterprise-based public finance; Constitutional political economy; D72; H11; H71; L32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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