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Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education

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  • Justina A.V. Fischer

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Abstract

Identification of a deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance by studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of the exact transmission channels for this impact. Studies for the U.S. that find an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes support the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. However, research for Switzerland using a time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and class size detects no such effect. These findings are in line with previous analyses that identify efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland. Version: 7 Dec 2005

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 with number 2005-22.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-22

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Justina AV Fischer & Antonio Rodriguez-Andrés, 2008. "Political institutions and suicide: A regional analysis of Switzerland," TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz 33, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  3. Falch, Torberg & Fischer, Justina AV, 2010. "Public sector decentralization and school performance: International evidence," MPRA Paper 20331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Fischer, Justina AV, 2009. "Development of Direct Democracy in Swiss Cantons between 1997 and 2003," MPRA Paper 16140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer, 2008. "Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? System stability versus government efficiency: an empirical test," TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz 41, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  6. Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer, 2007. "The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 267-292, March.
  7. Fischer, Justina A.V., 2007. "The Impact of Direct Democracy on Public Education: Evidence for Swiss Students in Reading, Mathematics and Natural Science," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 688, Stockholm School of Economics.
  8. Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2009. "Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany 313/2009, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  9. Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, 2012. "Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 77-95, January.

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