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Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment

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Author Info
Hai Wang ()
Weidong Zhang
Jingjing Wang
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10644-007-9031-3
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Change and Restructuring.

Volume (Year): 40 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 267-280
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:40:y:2007:i:3:p:267-280

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113294

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Related research
Keywords: Auction; SOE; Employment constraint; D44; L32; E24;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Fernando Branco, 1997. "The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 63-81, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 2001. "Corruption and auctions," Microeconomics 0105002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Cripps, Martin & Ireland, Norman, 1994. "The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(423), pages 316-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  6. Boone, Jan & Goeree, Jacob K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1997. "Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways," CEPR Discussion Papers 1541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alberto Cavaliere, 2006. "Privatization and Efficiency: from Principals and Agents to Political Economy," Working Papers 2006.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1988. "Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 335-354, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Zsuzsanna Fluck & Kose John & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "Privatization with Political Constraints: Auctions versus Private Negotiations," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-006, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  11. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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