Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Change and Restructuring.
Volume (Year): 40 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113294
Auction; SOE; Employment constraint; D44; L32; E24;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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