Privatization with Political Constraint: Auctions versus Private Negotiations
AbstractThis paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparantly suboptimal
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number 98-034.
Date of creation: 15 Apr 1997
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Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0100
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
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Other versions of this item:
- Zsuzsanna Fluck & Kose John & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "Privatization with Political Constraints: Auctions versus Private Negotiations," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-006, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
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- Baldwin, Carliss Y. & Bhattacharyya, Sugato, 1991. "Choosing the method of sale *1: A clinical study of Conrail," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 69-98, November.
- Hai Wang & Weidong Zhang & Jingjing Wang, 2007. "Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 267-280, September.
- Banerji, Sanjay & Errunza, Vihang R., 2005. "Privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 735-757, March.
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