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Impact of Currency Boards on Fiscal Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries

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Author Info
Dalia Grigonyté ()
Abstract

The paper focuses on the impact of currency boards on fiscal policy in transition economies. Starting with an overview of theoretical and empirical studies in the related area, it tests for the interaction between monetary policy regimes and fiscal policy in Central and Eastern European countries who aim for the membership in the European Union. The theoretical background of this study lies in the model of Tornell and Velasco (1998). They demonstrate that fiscal transfers do not ultimately depend on the chosen exchange rate and monetary policy, but only on the world's real rate of interest and the rate of time preference of the fiscal authority. A sample of 10 accession candidates constitutes a group of countries which go through similar macroeconomic stabilisation processes but have chosen different nominal anchors. The paper investigates whether there are any systematic differences between those countries with a currency board arrangement and those without. The empirical evidence suggests that currency boards enhance fiscal discipline in Central and Eastern European countries. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/B:ECOP.0000012257.47728.74
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Planning.

Volume (Year): 36 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 111-133
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:36:y:2003:i:2:p:111-133

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Related research
Keywords: currency board; exchange rate regimes; fiscal discipline;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina, 2000. "Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes: a Case for Currency Boards?," Banco de España Working Papers 0006, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fatás, Antonio & Rose, Andrew K, 2001. "Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson, 2002. "Policy Pre-Commitment and Institutional Design: A Synthetic Indicator Applied to Currency Boards," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 330, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Fixed versus flexible exchange rates: Which provides more fiscal discipline?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 399-436, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Paul R. Masson & Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1991. "Characteristics of a Successful Exchange Rate System," IMF Occasional Papers 82, International Monetary Fund.
  6. A. Javier Hamann, 1999. "Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization - ACritical Look at the Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 99/132, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Lucjan T Orlowski, 2005. "A Dynamic Approach to Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies," Macroeconomics 0501038, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chetan Ghate & Paul J. Zak, . "Growth of Government And The Politics of Fiscal Policy," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-19, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Adam Bennett, 1993. "The Operation of the Estonian Currency Board," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 92/3, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Anne Marie Gulde & Juha Kähkönen & Peter Keller, 2000. "Pros and Cons of Currency Board Arrangements in the Lead-Up to EU Accession and Participation in the Euro Zone," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 00/1, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1988. "The advantage of tying one's hands : EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1055-1075, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Anne Marie Gulde, 1999. "The Role of the Currency Board in Bulgaria's Stabilization," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 99/3, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, 1995. "Money-Based versus Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization with Endogenous Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 5300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Halpern, László & Neményi, Judit, 2002. "Fiscal Foundation of Convergence to European Union in Pre-Accession Transition Countries," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2002,03, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  15. Tavlas, George S, 2000. "On the Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor: The Rise and Fall of the Credibility Hypothesis," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 76(233), pages 183-201, June.
  16. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1998. "Fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philipp Paulus, 2006. "The final blow to the Stability Pact? EMU enlargement and government debt," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2006, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland. [Downloadable!]
  2. Karsten Staehr, 2007. "Fiscal policies and business cycles in an enlarged euro area," Bank of Estonia Working Papers 2007-03, Bank of Estonia, revised 08 Mar 2007. [Downloadable!]
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