Impact of Currency Boards on Fiscal Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries
AbstractThe paper focuses on the impact of currency boards on fiscal policy in transition economies. Starting with an overview of theoretical and empirical studies in the related area, it tests for the interaction between monetary policy regimes and fiscal policy in Central and Eastern European countries who aim for the membership in the European Union. The theoretical background of this study lies in the model of Tornell and Velasco (1998). They demonstrate that fiscal transfers do not ultimately depend on the chosen exchange rate and monetary policy, but only on the world's real rate of interest and the rate of time preference of the fiscal authority. A sample of 10 accession candidates constitutes a group of countries which go through similar macroeconomic stabilisation processes but have chosen different nominal anchors. The paper investigates whether there are any systematic differences between those countries with a currency board arrangement and those without. The empirical evidence suggests that currency boards enhance fiscal discipline in Central and Eastern European countries. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Planning.
Volume (Year): 36 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113294
currency board; exchange rate regimes; fiscal discipline;
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