Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes
Abstract
This Paper is an empirical study of fiscal policy in countries with extreme monetary regimes. We study members of multilateral currency unions, dollarized countries that officially use the money of another country, and countries using currency boards. We find that belonging to an international common currency area is not associated with fiscal discipline; if anything, spending and taxes are higher inside currency unions. This effect is especially pronounced for dollarized countries that unilaterally adopt the currency of another country. Currency boards are associated with fiscal restraint.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2692.Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2692
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Related research
Keywords: Budget; Empirical; Government; Panel; Revenue; Spending; Tax;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
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