The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal De Economist.
Volume (Year): 156 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100260
Competition law; Antitrust enforcement; Mergers; Macro-economic effects; L16; L40; L50;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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