Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dennis W. Carlton

    (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice)

Abstract

In 2002, Congress established the Antitrust Modernization Commission to address whether the antitrust laws needed to be changed in light of globalization and rapid technological change. This paper addresses that question. Although the basic framework of the antitrust laws is suitable to deal with current economic conditions, the paper identifies several areas where antitrust can be improved. The paper first examines whether the proper criterion for antitrust should be total or consumer surplus. Then it identifies some key issues that need to be clarified and explains how they should be clarified. Those issues include market definition, merger policy and the treatment of efficiencies, the interaction of antitrust and intellectual property, exclusionary conduct, the right of indirect purchasers to sue, and the proper allocation of responsibility between regulation and antitrust.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/221242.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Justice, Antitrust Division in its series EAG Discussions Papers with number 200703.

as in new window
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:doj:eagpap:200703

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Justice Antitrust Division 450 Fifth Street NW Washington, DC 20530
Email:
Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
  3. Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2007. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 12902, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2013. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Law and Economics 0303005, EconWPA.
  5. Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
  6. Easterbrook, Frank H & Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1980. "Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 331-70, October.
  7. Dennis W. Carlton & Robert H. Gertner, 2002. "Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior," NBER Working Papers 8976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  9. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  10. Unknown & Dennis Carlton, 2007. "Market Definition: Use and Abuse," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
  11. Lemley, Mark A. & Shapiro, Carl, 2004. "Probabilistic Patents," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9xf1488p, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  12. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Crandall, Robert W. & Winston, Clifford, 2004. "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence," Working paper 263, Regulation2point0.
  14. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling," EAG Discussions Papers 200801, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  2. Brennan, Timothy J., 2009. "Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony?," Discussion Papers dp-09-20, Resources For the Future.
  3. Dennis Carlton & Ken Heyer, 2007. "The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 121-137, September.
  4. Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2009. "Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200907, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  5. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  6. Zimmerman, Paul R. & Carlson, Julie A., 2010. "Competition and cost pass-through in differentiated oligopolies," MPRA Paper 25931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Robert Crandall & Charles Jackson, 2011. "Antitrust in High-Tech Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 319-362, June.
  8. Andrew Young & William Shughart, 2010. "The consequences of the US DOJ’s antitrust activities: A macroeconomic perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 409-422, March.
  9. Ghosh, Arghya & Morita, Hodaka, 2012. "Competitor collaboration and product distinctiveness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 137-152.
  10. Bougette, Patrice, 2010. "Preventing merger unilateral effects: A Nash-Cournot approach to asset divestitures," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 162-174, September.
  11. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  12. Fiammetta Gordon & David Squires, 2008. "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 411-432, December.
  13. Russ Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
  14. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  15. Brennan, Timothy J., 2011. "Energy efficiency and renewables policies: Promoting efficiency or facilitating monopsony?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 3954-3965, July.
  16. David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2012. "Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 19-40, February.
  17. Pingping Shan & Guofu Tan & Simon Wilkie & Michael Williams, 2012. "China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 31-52, August.
  18. Marc Fusaro & Richard Ericson, 2010. "The Welfare Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-73, March.
  19. Timothy J. Brennan, 2009. "Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony?," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-110, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2009.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:doj:eagpap:200703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tung Vu).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.