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Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?

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  • Dennis W. Carlton

Abstract

Economics has had an enormous positive effect on the evolution of antitrust policy over the last 30 years or so. However, the evolving forces of technology and globalization, together with experience gained over time, suggest that further modernization is in order. This paper addresses a number of controversial antitrust doctrines that need fixing, or at least some modernizing. Specifically, I analyze market definition; the interaction of intellectual property and antitrust law; certain types of exclusionary conduct (tying and bundling discounts); and procedural issues involving economic matters such as damage multiples, the right to sue, and laws of contribution. I am currently Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and have served as a Commissioner on the Congress-appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC). While I've drawn on these experiences in forming my opinions, the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the AMC or those of the Department of Justice.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.21.3.155
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 21 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Pages: 155-176

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:21:y:2007:i:3:p:155-176

Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.21.3.155
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References

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  1. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  2. Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
  3. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
  4. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  5. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Dennis W. Carlton & Robert H. Gertner, 2002. "Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior," NBER Working Papers 8976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Market Definition: Use and Abuse," EAG Discussions Papers 200706, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  8. Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2013. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September.
  10. Shapiro, Carl, 2000. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt4hs5s9wk, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  11. Lemley, Mark A. & Shapiro, Carl, 2004. "Probabilistic Patents," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9xf1488p, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  12. Easterbrook, Frank H & Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1980. "Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 331-70, October.
  13. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew Young & William Shughart, 2010. "The consequences of the US DOJ’s antitrust activities: A macroeconomic perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 409-422, March.
  2. Zimmerman, Paul R. & Carlson, Julie A., 2010. "Competition and cost pass-through in differentiated oligopolies," MPRA Paper 25931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2009. "Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare," Working Papers 90/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  4. Timothy J. Brennan, 2009. "Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony?," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-110, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2009.
  5. Marc Fusaro & Richard Ericson, 2010. "The Welfare Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-73, March.
  6. David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2012. "Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 19-40, February.
  7. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  8. Russ Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
  9. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling," EAG Discussions Papers 200801, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  10. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  11. Brennan, Timothy J., 2009. "Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony?," Discussion Papers dp-09-20, Resources For the Future.
  12. Bougette, Patrice, 2010. "Preventing merger unilateral effects: A Nash-Cournot approach to asset divestitures," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 162-174, September.
  13. Robert Crandall & Charles Jackson, 2011. "Antitrust in High-Tech Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 319-362, June.
  14. Dennis Carlton & Ken Heyer, 2007. "The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 121-137, September.
  15. Fiammetta Gordon & David Squires, 2008. "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 411-432, December.
  16. Brennan, Timothy J., 2011. "Energy efficiency and renewables policies: Promoting efficiency or facilitating monopsony?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 3954-3965, July.
  17. Ghosh, Arghya & Morita, Hodaka, 2012. "Competitor collaboration and product distinctiveness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 137-152.
  18. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.

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