IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v29y2011i5p505-512.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Remedies for tying in computer applications

Author

Listed:
  • Gans, Joshua S.

Abstract

Recent anti-trust decisions have proposed remedies for tying of different computer software and applications. The remedies have drawn criticism for being ineffectual. This paper develops a model tailored to deal with the specific issue of tying in computer applications. It provides a rationale for such tying and also any associated harm to social welfare. It then examines proposed remedies and finds conditions under which those remedies will be effective in improving social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Gans, Joshua S., 2011. "Remedies for tying in computer applications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 505-512, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:5:p:505-512
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718711000026
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonard K. Cheng & Jae Nahm, 2007. "Product boundary, vertical competition, and the double mark-upproblem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 447-466, June.
    2. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    3. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 85-105, August.
    4. Jay Pil Choi, 2010. "Tying In Two‐Sided Markets With Multi‐Homing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 607-626, September.
    5. Michael D. Whinston, 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 63-80, Spring.
    6. Jay Pil Choi, 2004. "Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements," CESifo Working Paper Series 1336, CESifo.
    7. Choi, Jay Pil & Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 2001. "Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 52-71, Spring.
    8. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
    9. Jean Tirole, 2005. "The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
    10. Matutes, Carmen & Regibeau, Pierre, 1992. "Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 37-54, March.
    11. Ayres Ian & Nalebuff Barry, 2005. "Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU's Antitrust Case and Remedy," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-12, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 85-105, August.
    2. Jihui Chen & Qiang Fu, 2017. "Do exclusivity arrangements harm consumers?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 311-339, June.
    3. Gans, Joshua S., 2012. "Mobile application pricing," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 52-59.
    4. Decarolis, Francesco & Li, Muxin, 2023. "Regulating online search in the EU: From the android case to the digital markets act and digital services act," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Vickers, 2007. "Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance," Economics Series Working Papers 376, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220, Elsevier.
    3. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 85-105, August.
    4. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2009. "Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling," IDEI Working Papers 574, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jul 2011.
    5. Oliver Budzinski & Katharina Wacker, 2007. "The Prohibition Of The Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1 Merger: How Much Economics In German Merger Control?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-306.
    6. Jihui Chen & Qiang Fu, 2017. "Do exclusivity arrangements harm consumers?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 311-339, June.
    7. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    8. Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    9. Halmenschlager, Christine & Mantovani, Andrea, 2017. "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in complementary markets with cost savings," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 45-59.
    10. Kenneth S. Corts, 2018. "How the source of the entrant's advantage limits entry‐deterring tying," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 510-527, May.
    11. Gastón Llanes & Andrea Mantovani & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2019. "Entry into Complementary Good Markets with Network Effects," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 262-282, December.
    12. Sang‐Hyun Kim & Jong‐Hee Hahn, 2022. "On the profitability of interfirm bundling in oligopolies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 657-673, August.
    13. Akifumi Ishihara & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2013. "Dark Sides of Patent Pools with Compulsory Independent Licensing," CARF F-Series CARF-F-318, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    14. Begoña García-Mariñoso & Xavier Martinez-Giralt & Pau Olivella, 2008. "Bundling in Telecommunications," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 762.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    15. Alessandro Avenali & Anna D’Annunzio & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2013. "Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(3), pages 221-241, November.
    16. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    17. Kuroda, Toshifumi & Koguchi, Teppei & Ida, Takanori, 2019. "Identifying the effect of mobile operating systems on the mobile services market," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 86-95.
    18. Packalen, Mikko, 2010. "Complements and potential competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 244-253, May.
    19. Jidong Zhou, 2017. "Competitive Bundling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 145-172, January.
    20. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tying Software Microsoft Remedies;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:5:p:505-512. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.