Antitrust and Regulation
AbstractSince the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12902.
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Dennis W. Carlton, Randal C. Picker. "Antitrust and Regulation," in Nancy L. Rose, editor, "Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?" University of Chicago Press (2013)
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Other versions of this item:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-02-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2007-02-24 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2007-02-24 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-02-24 (Regulation)
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