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Antitrust and Regulation

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Author Info
Dennis W. Carlton
Randal C. Picker

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Abstract

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12902.

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Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12902

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daniel, Timothy P & Kleit, Andrew N, 1995. "Disentangling Regulatory Policy: The Effects of State Regulations on Trucking Rates," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-84, November.
  2. Davis, David E & Wilson, Wesley W, 1999. "Deregulation, Mergers, and Employment in the Railroad Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-78, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peoples, James, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-30, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pindyck, Robert S., 2005. "Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust," Working papers 18233, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1992. "An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 89-131, April.
  7. Ivaldi, Marc & Mccullough, Gerard, 2005. "Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers," IDEI Working Papers 344, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
  11. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Moore, Thomas Gale, 1978. "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 327-43, October.
  13. Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel & Elisabeth M. Landes, 2004. "The Control of Externalities in Sports Leagues: An Analysis of Restrictions in the National Hockey League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages S268-S288, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Michael H. Belzer, 1995. "Collective bargaining after deregulation: Do the Teamsters still count?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 48(4), pages 636-655, July.
  15. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Giordano, James N, 1997. "Returns to Scale and Market Concentration among the Largest Survivors of Deregulation in the US Trucking Industry," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 29(1), pages 101-10, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Elena Carletti & Philipp Hartmann & Steven Ongena, 2007. "The economic impact of merger control - what is special about banking?," Working Paper Series 786, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Morris E. Morkre & Dean Spinanger & Lien H. Tran, 2008. "Are Unfair Import Laws Unfair to Developing Countries: Evidence from U.S. Antidumping Actions 1990-2004," Kiel Working Papers 1438, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July. [Downloadable!]
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