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Rules, Organizations, and Governments

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  • John Wallis

Abstract

Social scientists generally accept a Hobbesian conception of government as a coercive rule enforcer. This paper challenges the idea that the essential feature of government is its ability to coerce, and argues instead that the essential feature of government is its ability to coordinate. Governments are defined as organizations that publicly signify agreements. The utility of the new perspective is demonstrated by reconsidering how societies acquire the ability to create and enforce impersonal rules, rules that treat everyone the same, as the process of modern political and economic development gets under way. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2015

Suggested Citation

  • John Wallis, 2015. "Rules, Organizations, and Governments," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 43(1), pages 69-86, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:43:y:2015:i:1:p:69-86
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-015-9450-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    2. John Joseph Wallis, 2006. "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History," NBER Chapters, in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 23-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444.
    4. Wallis, John Joseph, 2011. "Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 48-64.
    5. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    6. Wallis, John Joseph, 2005. "Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 211-256, March.
    7. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    8. Wallis, John Joseph, 2011. "Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 48-64, June.
    9. Levy, Jonathan, 2012. "Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674047488, Spring.
    10. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Webb,Steven B. & Weingast,Barry R. (ed.), 2013. "In the Shadow of Violence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107684911.
    11. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Webb,Steven B. & Weingast,Barry R. (ed.), 2013. "In the Shadow of Violence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107014213.
    12. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market structure; Economic systems; Economic growth; K1; K3; L1; L3; N00; N4; O1; O2; P00; P5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O2 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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