Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions
AbstractInstitutional economists concerned with rules often focus on the trade-off between individuals and social incentives. This paper argues that the real trade-off that individuals face is between the organizations they belong to in contrast to social rules, and asks when do individuals find it in their interests to act in the interests of their organizations and when do they support impersonal rules? The answer involves a distinction between anonymous relationships between individuals who do not know each other personally, but know the organizations that the other belongs to, and impersonal relationships in which all individuals are treated the same.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 79 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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- Benito Arruñada, 2012.
"Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework,"
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- Benito Arruñada, 2012. "Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-144, July.
- Benito Arruñada, 2012. "Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework," Economics Working Papers 1308, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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