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Dilbert-Peter Model of Organization Effectiveness: Computer Simulations

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  • Pawel Sobkowicz

Abstract

We describe a computer model of general effectiveness of a hierarchical organization depending on two main aspects: effects of promotion to managerial levels and efforts to self-promote of individual employees, reducing their actual productivity. The combination of judgment by appearance in the promotion to higher levels of hierarchy and the Peter Principle (which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence) results in fast declines in effectiveness of the organization. The model uses a few synthetic parameters aimed at reproduction of realistic conditions in typical multilayer organizations. It is shown that improving organization resiliency to self-promotion and continuity of individual productiveness after a promotion can greatly improve the overall organization effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Pawel Sobkowicz, 2010. "Dilbert-Peter Model of Organization Effectiveness: Computer Simulations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(4), pages 1-4.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2010-14-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Secchi & Raffaello Seri, 2017. "Controlling for false negatives in agent-based models: a review of power analysis in organizational research," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 94-121, March.
    2. Cheng, Yuan & Chang, Meng & Xue, Yanbo, 2020. "A computational study of promotion dynamics and organizational efficiency," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 560(C).
    3. Sobkowicz, Pawel, 2016. "Agent based model of effects of task allocation strategies in flat organizations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 458(C), pages 17-30.

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