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Inferring Quality from Wait Time

Author

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  • Mirko Kremer

    (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany)

  • Laurens Debo

    (Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755)

Abstract

We study the impact of wait time on consumers’ purchasing behavior when product quality is unknown to some consumers (the “uninformed consumers”) but known to others (the “informed consumers”). In a capacitated environment, wait times act as a signal of quality for uninformed consumers because, due to informed consumers in the population, low (high) quality products tend to generate shorter (longer) wait times. Hence, longer wait times may increase uninformed consumers’ perceived quality, and they may still purchase the product, even when the wait time is long. Similarly, short wait times decrease the consumers’ perceived quality, and they may walk away despite the short wait—the “empty restaurant syndrome.” This paper develops and tests a theory of observational learning that predicts these effects. We find that uninformed consumers’ purchasing probability at short waits decreases in the presence of informed consumers. Furthermore, we find that relatively few informed consumers suffice to create this effect. Finally, we show that the purchasing frequency might even increase in the wait time.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2264 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management .

Suggested Citation

  • Mirko Kremer & Laurens Debo, 2016. "Inferring Quality from Wait Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 3023-3038, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:62:y:2016:i:10:p:3023-3038
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2264
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    Cited by:

    1. Morgan Swink & Kejia Hu & Xiande Zhao, 2022. "Analytics applications, limitations, and opportunities in restaurant supply chains," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(10), pages 3710-3726, October.
    2. Ruomeng Cui & Dennis J. Zhang & Achal Bassamboo, 2019. "Learning from Inventory Availability Information: Evidence from Field Experiments on Amazon," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 1216-1235, March.
    3. Linda Dezso & Gergely Hajdu & Yossef Tobol, 2024. "Unexpected Waiting Corrupts," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp358, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Ming Hu & Yang Li & Jianfu Wang, 2018. "Efficient Ignorance: Information Heterogeneity in a Queue," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2650-2671, June.
    5. Pengfei Guo & Moshe Haviv & Zhenwei Luo & Yulan Wang, 2022. "Optimal queue length information disclosure when service quality is uncertain," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(5), pages 1912-1927, May.
    6. Ryan W. Buell, 2021. "Last-Place Aversion in Queues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1430-1452, March.
    7. Debjit Roy & Eirini Spiliotopoulou & Jelle de Vries, 2022. "Restaurant analytics: Emerging practice and research opportunities," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(10), pages 3687-3709, October.
    8. Robert J. Batt & Jordan D. Tong, 2020. "Mean Service Metrics: Biased Quality Judgment and the Customer–Server Quality Gap," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(5), pages 975-995, September.
    9. Dezsîo, Linda & Hajdu, Gergely & Tobol, Yossef, 2024. "Unexpected waiting corrupts," Research Papers 26, EcoAustria – Institute for Economic Research.
    10. Hajdu, Gergely & Dezső, Linda & Tobol, Yossef, 2024. "Unexpected Waiting Corrupts," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 358, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    11. Sezer Ülkü & Chris Hydock & Shiliang Cui, 2020. "Making the Wait Worthwhile: Experiments on the Effect of Queueing on Consumption," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1149-1171, March.
    12. Bendoly, Elliot & van Wezel, Wout & Bachrach, Daniel G. (ed.), 2015. "The Handbook of Behavioral Operations Management: Social and Psychological Dynamics in Production and Service Settings," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199357222.
    13. Gregory DeCroix & Xiaoyang Long & Jordan Tong, 2021. "How Service Quality Variability Hurts Revenue When Customers Learn: Implications for Dynamic Personalized Pricing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 683-708, May.

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