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Observational learning under imperfect information

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Author Info
Celen, Bogachan
Kariv, Shachar

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-49HDPWV-1/2/5eb4753e54010fa514f64d681d8df149
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 72-86
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:72-86

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Social Leanring with Course Inference," WEF Working Papers 0050, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2008. "Bayesian Learning in Social Networks," NBER Working Papers 14040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Boðaçhan Çelen & Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, 2005. "Words Speak Louder than Actions and Improve Welfare: An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000250, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Klaus Kultti & Paavo Miettinen, 2007. "Herding with Costly Observation," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1320-1320. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Boğaçhan Çelen & Shachar Kariv, 2004. "Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 484-498, June. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mathias Drehmann & Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider, 2005. "Herding with and without Payoff Externalities - An Internet Experiment," Working Papers 0420, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehie, 2009. "Social Learning with Coarse Inference," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000292, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Shachar Kariv, 2005. "Overconfidence and Informational Cascades," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000406, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Celen, Bogachan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2006. "Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 1440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Jonathan E. Alevy & Michael S. Haigh & John List, 2006. "Information Cascades: Evidence from An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals," NBER Working Papers 12767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Erin Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2007. "The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-Social Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 3169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  12. Jacob Goeree & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers, 2004. "Self-Correcting Information Cascades," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000153, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Boðaçhan Çelen & Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, 2006. "An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000272, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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