Informational Externalities, Herding and Incentives
AbstractA version of the herding prediction model with a rational expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost term. It is found that the inefficiency of herding at the market solution is low when the cost of providing incentives is high. When the cost of providing incentives is low (and this happens when prior information is diffuse) the incentive efficient solution approaches the team solution that fully internalizes the information externality. Then the herding problem at the market solution is at its worst.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3080.
Date of creation: Nov 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Lluís Bru & Xavier Vives, 2002. "Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(1), pages 91-, March.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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