Efficient Asset Allocations in the Banking Sector and Financial Regulation
AbstractThe failure of a bank or the case of a bank experiencing a crisis usually has negative spillovers for other banks in the economy, such as through informational contagion or an increased cost of borrowing. Such spillovers are likely to be higher when the other banks are close to failure as well. This paper shows that this gives rise to externalities among banks which arise from their portfolio choices. The reason is that the assets a bank holds on its balance sheet determine the situations in which a bank will be in a crisis, and thus whether this will be at a time when other banks are in a crisis as well. As a result, the equilibrium portfolio allocations in the economy are typically not efficient. Some banks may choose too correlated portfolios, but others may choose tooheterogeneous portfolios. The optimal regulatory treatment of banks is typically heterogeneous and may involve encouraging more correlation at already highly correlated banks but lowering correlation at other banks. Additional inefficiencies arise when bank failures also have implications outside the banking sector. Overall, the paper highlights a role for regulation in a financial system in which the costs of financial stress at institutions are interdependent. JEL Codes: G21, G28.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.
Volume (Year): 5 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Acharya, Viral & Song Shin, Hyun & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2009. "Endogenous choice of bank liquidity: the role of fire sales," Bank of England working papers 376, Bank of England.
- Perotti, Enrico C. & Suarez, Javier, 2002.
"Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1599-1622, October.
- Isabel Schnabel & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Liquidity and Contagion: The Crisis of 1763," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 929-968, December.
- Riccetti, Luca & Russo, Alberto & Gallegati, Mauro, 2013.
"Leveraged network-based financial accelerator,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1626-1640.
- Toni Ahnert, 2014. "Rollover Risk, Liquidity and Macroprudential Regulation," Working Papers 14-23, Bank of Canada.
- Jin Cao & Gerhard Illing, 2010.
"Regulation of systemic liquidity risk,"
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management,
Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 31-48, March.
- Reint Gropp & Anil Kashyap, 2009.
"A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe,"
NBER Working Papers
14735, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nijskens, Rob & Wagner, Wolf, 2011. "Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1391-1398, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Timo Laurmaa).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.