On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking
AbstractWe analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) in its series SIRE Discussion Papers with number 2008-26.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kaniska Dam & Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2009. "On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking," ESE Discussion Papers 187, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Kaniska Dam & Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Santiago Sánchez Pages, 2009. "On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking," Working papers DTE 459, CIDE, División de Economía.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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CEPR Discussion Papers
4831, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Brito, Duarte, 2003. "Preemptive mergers under spatial competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1601-1622, December.
- Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April.
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