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Bargaining theory without tears

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  • Ken Binmore

    (University College London)

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.fundacionsepi.es/InvEcon/paperArchive/Sep1994/v18i3a1.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.

    Volume (Year): 18 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 403-419

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    Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:18:y:1994:i:3:p:403-419

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    Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
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    Web page: http://www.fundacionsepi.es/

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    3. Bester,Helmut, 1986. "Bargaining,Search costs and equilibrium price distribution," Discussion Paper Serie A 49, University of Bonn, Germany.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    6. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
    7. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 753-70, November.
    8. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002376, David K. Levine.
    9. Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-94, October.
    10. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
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    Cited by:
    1. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Kopp, Andreas, 1996. "Layoffs, job search and labour market pooling," Kiel Working Papers 729, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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