IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedker/y1999iqiip57-75nv.84no.2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does faster loan growth lead to higher loan losses?

Author

Listed:
  • William R. Keeton

Abstract

During the last couple of years, concern has increased that the exceptionally rapid growth in business loans at commercial banks has been due in large part to excessively easy credit standards. Some analysts argue that competition for loan customers has greatly increased, causing banks to reduce loan rates and ease credit standards to obtain new business. Others argue that as the economic expansion has continued and memories of past loan losses have faded, banks have become more willing to take risks. Whichever explanation is correct, the acceleration in loan growth could lead eventually to a surge in loan losses, reducing bank profits and sparking a new round of bank failures. As the experience of the early 1990s made clear, such a slump in banking could not only threaten the deposit insurance fund but also slow the economy by discouraging banks from granting new loans.> The view that faster loan growth leads to higher loan losses should not be dismissed lightly; nor should it be accepted without question. If loan growth increases because banks become more willing to lend, credit standards should fall and loan losses should eventually rise. But loan growth can increase for reasons other than a shift in supply, for example, businesses may decide to shift their financing from the capital markets to banks, or an increase in productivity may boost the returns to investment. In such cases, faster loan growth need not lead to higher loan losses.> Keeton explains why supply shifts are necessary for faster loan growth to lead to higher loan losses and determines if supply shifts have caused loan growth and loan losses to be positively related in the past. On balance, he finds limited support for the view that supply shifts have caused loan growth and loan losses to be positively related. Data on business loans and delinquencies show that states experiencing unusually rapid loan growth tended to experience unusually big increases in delinquency rates several years later. His finding is tempered, however, by evidence on business loan growth and business credit standards suggesting that changes in loan growth are not always due to shifts in supply.

Suggested Citation

  • William R. Keeton, 1999. "Does faster loan growth lead to higher loan losses?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 84(Q II), pages 57-75.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedker:y:1999:i:qii:p:57-75:n:v.84no.2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/1183/1999-Does%20Faster%20Loan%20Growth%20Lead%20to%20Higher%20Loan%20Losses%3F.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raymond E. Owens & Stacey L. Schreft, 1991. "Survey evidence of tighter credit conditions: what does it mean?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 77(Mar), pages 29-34.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
    3. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Kausar Hamdani & Anthony P. Rodrigues & Maria Varvatsoulis, 1994. "Survey evidence on credit tightening and the factors behind the recent credit crunch," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 1994seoctatfbtrc.
    6. John A. Weinberg, 1995. "Cycles in lending standards?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 1-18.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Asea, Patrick K. & Blomberg, Brock, 1998. "Lending cycles," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1-2), pages 89-128.
    2. Ravn, Søren Hove, 2016. "Endogenous credit standards and aggregate fluctuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 89-111.
    3. G. B. Gorton & Ping He, 2008. "Bank Credit Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(4), pages 1181-1214.
    4. Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Andrea Orame, 2020. "The role of bank supply in the Italian credit market: evidence from a new regional survey," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1279, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2015. "Cash-flow business taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information," Working Papers 1531, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    7. Hyytinen, Ari, 2003. "Information production and lending market competition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 233-253.
    8. Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
    9. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    10. Samuel Fosu & Albert Danso & Henry Agyei-Boapeah & Collins G. Ntim & Emmanuel Adegbite, 2020. "Credit information sharing and loan default in developing countries: the moderating effect of banking market concentration and national governance quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 55-103, July.
    11. Allen Blackman, 2001. "Why don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1024-1035.
    12. Cieply Sylvie, 2001. "The Radical Change of French Firms’ Financial Characteristics. Macroeconomic Consequences and Lessons for Political Economics / Die französische Finanzrevolution. Die Folgen für die Finanzstruktur der," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(5-6), pages 556-576, October.
    13. Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
    14. Andreas Kern & Puspa Amri, 2021. "Political credit cycles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 76-108, March.
    15. Galindo, Arturo & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 2002. "Credit Constraints in Latin America: An Overview of the Micro Evidence," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1438, Inter-American Development Bank.
    16. Alessandria, George & Qian, Jun, 2005. "Endogenous financial intermediation and real effects of capital account liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 97-128, September.
    17. Giuseppe Coco & David De Meza, 2009. "In Defense of Usury Laws," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(8), pages 1691-1703, December.
    18. Sherrill Shaffer & Scott Hoover, 2008. "Endogenous screening, credit crunches, and competition in laxity," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 296-314, December.
    19. Bordo, Michael D. & Haubrich, Joseph G., 2010. "Credit crises, money and contractions: An historical view," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
    20. AMENDOLA, Adalgiso & BARRA, Cristian & BOCCIA, Marinella & PAPACCIO, Anna, 2018. "Market Structure and Financial Stability: Theory and Evidence," CELPE Discussion Papers 156, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loans; Bank loans;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedker:y:1999:i:qii:p:57-75:n:v.84no.2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Zach Kastens (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbkcus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.