Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB

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Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB

Author Info

Kateřina Šmídková () (Czech National Bank)
Aleš Bulíř () (International Monetary Fund)

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Abstract

The Czech National Bank has a respectable track record in terms of its policy actions and the corresponding inflation outturns. The authors analyze its main communication tools – inflation targets, inflation forecasts, verbal assessments of the inflation risks contained in quarterly inflation reports, and the voting within the CNB Board – to assess clarity of communication. They find that these tools provided a very clear message in about three out of every four observations in our 2001–2005 sample.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences in its journal Finance a uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 57 (2007)
Issue (Month): 11-12 (December)
Pages: 540-557
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Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:540-557

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Paper
- Katerina SmÃdkovÃ¡ & Ales Bulir, 2008. "Striving to Be "Clearly Open" and "Crystal Clear": Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB," IMF Working Papers 08/84, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure of Interest Rates
E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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