Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

The Czech National Bank has a respectable track record in terms of its policy actions and the corresponding inflation outturns. The authors analyze its main communication tools – inflation targets, inflation forecasts, verbal assessments of the inflation risks contained in quarterly inflation reports, and the voting within the CNB Board – to assess clarity of communication. They find that these tools provided a very clear message in about three out of every four observations in our 2001–2005 sample.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/1092_fau_11_12_2007_000000000052.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences in its journal Finance a uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 57 (2007)
Issue (Month): 11-12 (December)
Pages: 540-557

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:540-557

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Opletalova 26, CZ-110 00 Prague
Phone: +420 2 222112330
Fax: +420 2 22112304
Email:
Web page: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: transparency; communication; monetary policy; Czech National Bank;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
• E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
• E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Andrew G. Haldane & Nicoletta Batini, 1998. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Nicoletta Batini & Andrew Haldane, 1999. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 157-202 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Nicoletta Batini & Andrew G Haldane, 1999. "Forward-looking rules for monetary policy," Bank of England working papers 91, Bank of England.
2. Viktor Kotlan & David Navratil, 2003. "Inflation Targeting as a Stabilisation Tool: Its Design and Performance in the Czech Republic," Macroeconomics 0310006, EconWPA.
   
   • Viktor Kotlán & David Navrátil, 2003. "Inflation Targeting as a Stabilization Tool: Its Design and Performance in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 53(5-6), pages 220-242, May.
3. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
4. Bernhard Winkler, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank.
5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
   
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88701, Tilburg University.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172467, Tilburg University.
   • Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P.M., 2004. "How Transparent Are Central Banks?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0411, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
6. Ales Bulir & Jaromir Hurník, 2006. "The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: How Unpleasant is Purgatory?," IMF Working Papers 06/154, International Monetary Fund.
   
   • Bulir, Ales & Hurnik, Jaromir, 2006. "The Maastricht inflation criterion: How unpleasant is purgatory?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 385-404, December.
7. Q. Farooq Akram & Yakov Ben-Haim & Øyvind Eitrheim, 2006. "Managing uncertainty through robust-satisficing monetary policy," Working Paper 2006/10, Norges Bank.
8. Lavan Mahadeva & Katerina Smidkova, 2003. "What is the Appropriate Rate of Disinflation to Be Targeted in the Czech Economy?," Macroeconomics 0303015, EconWPA.
   
   • Lavan Mahadeva & Katerina Smidkova, 2001. "What Is the Appropriate Rate of Disinflation to Be Targeted in the Czech Economy?," Archive of Monetary Policy Division Working Papers 2001/33, Czech National Bank.
9. Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
   
   • Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-84, November.
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
10. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
    
    • Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
11. Geraats, Petra M., 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt0hw7h7cp, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    
    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Macroeconomics 0012011, EconWPA.
    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 41, European Central Bank.
    • Geraats, Petra M, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Geraats, P.M., 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Papers 41, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
12. Marcel Peter & Scott Roger & Geoffrey Heenan, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund.
13. Mikael Apel & Anders Vredin, 2007. "Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 499-520, December.
14. Richard Dennis & John C. Williams, 2007. "Monetary policy, transparency, and credibility: conference summary," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue May 25.
15. Rozkrut, Marek & Rybinski, Krzysztof & Sztaba, Lucyna & Szwaja, Radoslaw, 2007. "Quest for central bank communication: Does it pay to be "talkative"?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 176-206, March.
16. Lavan Mahadeva & Kateřina Šmídková, 2001. "What is the optimal rate of disinflation to be targeted in the czech economy?," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2001(2).
17. Martin Fukac, 2006. "New Keynesian Model Dynamics under Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning," Working Papers 2006/5, Czech National Bank, Research Department.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Radovan Fiser & Roman Horvath, 2010. "Central bank communication and exchange rate volatility: a GARCH analysis," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 25-31.
   
   • roman Horvath & Radovan Fiser, 2009. "Central Bank Communication and Exchange Rate Volatility: A GARCH Analysis," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp962, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:540-557

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Herrmannova).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal