Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on Ifo’s World Economicy Survey

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Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on Ifo’s World Economicy Survey

Author Info

Sandra Waller
Jakob de Haan ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Jakob de Haan

Abstract

This paper reports the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks. In line with the survey of Alan Blinder among central bankers, we asked participants in Ifo’s World Economic Survey to answer questions on the importance and determinants of credibility. The results of both surveys are very comparable. Credibility is considered to be important to attain price stability at low cost, while the best ways to earn credibility are a history of honesty and a high level of central bank independence. According to our respondents, the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks. The ECB is not perceived as highly credible or tranparent, even though our respondents consider it to be very independent.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1199.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1199

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
NEP-EEC-2004-06-02 (European Economics)
NEP-MON-2004-06-02 (Monetary Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Federico Ravenna, 2005. "The European Monetary Union as a Commitment Device for New EU Member States," Working Papers 98, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Federico Ravenna, 2005. "The European Monetary Union as a commitment device for new EU member states," Working Paper Series 516, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
Kaufmann, Daniel & Bellver, Ana, 2005. "Transparenting Transparency: Intial Empirics and Policy Applications," MPRA Paper 8188, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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