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More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment

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Abstract

We introduce and analyze the following variants of the Borda rule: median Borda rule,geometric Borda rule, Litvak’s method as well as methods based on forming linear combinations of entries in the preference outranking matrix. The properties we focus upon are the elimination of the Condorcet loser as well as several consistency-type criteria.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannu Nurmi & Hannu Salonen, 2008. "More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 109-122, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2008_109
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    6. Hannu Nurmi, 2004. "A Comparison of Some Distance-Based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 5-24, August.
    7. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    8. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sara Rye & Emel Aktas, 2022. "Serious Games as a Validation Tool for PREDIS: A Decision Support System for Disaster Management," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(24), pages 1-37, December.
    2. Hanna Bury & Dariusz Wagner, 2009. "Group judgement with ties. A position-based approach," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 9-26.
    3. Hanna Bury & Dariusz Wagner, 2009. "Group judgment with ties. A position-based approach," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(4), pages 7-26.
    4. Hannu Salonen, 2014. "Aggregating and Updating Information," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 55-67, October.
    5. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2022. "Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 365-391, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Borda rule; median rule; Nash welfare function; outranking matrix; maximin rule; consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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