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Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union

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Author Info

  • Oliver Pamp

    (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Free University Berlin)

Abstract

This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and institutional factors that can help explain differing degrees of fiscal retrenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001. Several variants of the partisan approach and the veto players framework are elucidated and applied to the question of budgetary consolidation. These elaborations yield five working hypotheses which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section data set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that partisan preferences and institutional veto players interact budgetary retrenchment in a rather counterintuitive way.

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File URL: http://eper.htw-berlin.de/no8/pamp.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium in its journal European Political Economy Review.

Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): Spring ()
Pages: 4-39

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Handle: RePEc:epe:journl:v:8:y:2008:i:spring:p:4-39

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Web page: http://eper.htw-berlin.de/
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Related research

Keywords: Deficits; Fiscal Adjustment; Partisan Models; Veto Player Models; Binary Time-Series Cross-Section Models;

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Cited by:
  1. Matthias Bauer, 2013. "Political Aversion To a Multilateral Fiscal Rule: The Dynamic Commitment Problem in European Fiscal Governance," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 44-2013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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