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Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union

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Author Info
Oliver Pamp (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Free University Berlin)

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Abstract

This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and institutional factors that can help explain differing degrees of fiscal retrenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001. Several variants of the partisan approach and the veto players framework are elucidated and applied to the question of budgetary consolidation. These elaborations yield five working hypotheses which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section data set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that partisan preferences and institutional veto players interact budgetary retrenchment in a rather counterintuitive way.

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File URL: http://eper.htw-berlin.de/no8/pamp.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium in its journal European Political Economy Review.

Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): Spring ()
Pages: 4-39
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Handle: RePEc:epe:journl:v:8:y:2008:i:spring:p:4-39

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Related research
Keywords: Deficits; Fiscal Adjustment; Partisan Models; Veto Player Models; Binary Time-Series Cross-Section Models;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

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