IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v66y2015icp237-253.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09

Author

Listed:
  • Lazzarini, Sergio G.
  • Musacchio, Aldo
  • Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo
  • Marcon, Rosilene

Abstract

Defendants of state-owned development banks emphasize their role in reducing capital constraints and fostering productive investment; detractors point out that they may benefit politically connected capitalists or bail out inefficient firms. We study the effect of loans and equity investments of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and find that they do not have any consistent effect on firm-level performance and investment, except for a reduction in financial expenditures due to the subsidies accompanying loans. However, BNDES does not systematically lend to underperforming firms. Our results indicate that BNDES subsidizes firms that could fund their projects with other sources of capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Lazzarini, Sergio G. & Musacchio, Aldo & Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo & Marcon, Rosilene, 2015. "What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 237-253.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:66:y:2015:i:c:p:237-253
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1400254X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.016?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Micco, Alejandro & Panizza, Ugo, 2004. "Should the Government Be in the Banking Business?: The Role of State-Owned and Development Banks," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1543, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz, 1999. "Development banking," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 83-100, February.
    3. João Alberto De Negri & Alessandro Maffioli & Cesar M. Rodriguez & Gonzalo Vázquez, 2011. "The Impact of Public Credit Programs on Brazilian Firms," SPD Working Papers 1103, Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness (SPD).
    4. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    5. Krueger, Anne O, 1990. "Government Failures in Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 9-23, Summer.
    6. Sapienza, Paola, 2004. "The effects of government ownership on bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 357-384, May.
    7. António Antunes & Tiago Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2015. "The effects of credit subsidies on development," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 1-30, January.
    8. Shawn Cole, 2009. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 219-250, January.
    9. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Financial Dependence and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 559-586, June.
    10. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-819, July.
    11. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Government Ownership of Banks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 265-301, February.
    12. Alberto Abadie & David Drukker & Jane Leber Herr & Guido W. Imbens, 2004. "Implementing matching estimators for average treatment effects in Stata," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 4(3), pages 290-311, September.
    13. Cull, Robert & Li, Wei & Sun, Bo & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Government connections and financial constraints: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 271-294.
    14. Musacchio,Aldo, 2015. "Experiments in Financial Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107514782.
    15. Rodrik, Dani, 2004. "Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century," CEPR Discussion Papers 4767, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Caughey, Devin & Sekhon, Jasjeet S., 2011. "Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942–2008," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 385-408.
    17. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-1042, July.
    18. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
    19. Nelson, Paul J., 2001. "Transparency Mechanisms at the Multilateral Development Banks," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1835-1847, November.
    20. Christa Hainz & Hendrik Hakenes, 2007. "The Politician and his Banker," CESifo Working Paper Series 2153, CESifo.
    21. Abadie, Alberto & Imbens, Guido W., 2011. "Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-11.
    22. João Alberto De Negri & Alessandro Maffioli & César Rodríguez & Gonzalo Vázquez, 2011. "The Impact of Public Credit Programs on Brazilian Firms," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 61998, Inter-American Development Bank.
    23. Justin Lin & Ha-Joon Chang, 2009. "Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy it? A Debate Between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 27(5), pages 483-502, September.
    24. Rodrigo Bandeira de Mello & Rosilene Marcon, 2005. "Unpacking firm effects: modeling political alliances in variance decomposition of firm performance in turbulent environments," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 9(spe1), pages 65-85.
    25. Arvate, Paulo Roberto & Barbosa, Klênio & Fuzitani, Eric, 2013. "Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states," Textos para discussão 336, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    26. Inoue, Carlos F. K. V. & Lazzarini, Sérgio G. & Musacchio, Aldo, 2012. "Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: Firm-Level Implications of Equity Purchases by the State," Insper Working Papers wpe_282, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    27. Bailey, Warren & Huang, Wei & Yang, Zhishu, 2011. "Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics: Some Evidence on Inside Debt in a State-Controlled Banking System," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(6), pages 1795-1830, December.
    28. Fordwor, Kwame D., 1981. "Some unresolved problems of the African Development Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 9(11-12), pages 1129-1139.
    29. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 331-372, June.
    30. Ndongko, Wilfred A., 1975. "Development Bank lending: The Cameroon experience," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 3(6), pages 421-425, June.
    31. repec:cup:jfinqa:v:46:y:2011:i:06:p:1795-1830_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    33. Thiago Rabelo Pereira & Adriano Simões & André Carvalhal, 2011. "Mensurando o Resultado Fiscal das Operações de Empréstimo do Tesouro ao BNDES: Custo ou Ganho Líquido Esperado para a União?," Discussion Papers 1665, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    34. Thomas D. Cook & William R. Shadish & Vivian C. Wong, 2008. "Three conditions under which experiments and observational studies produce comparable causal estimates: New findings from within-study comparisons," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 724-750.
    35. Falck, Oliver & Gollier, Christian & Woessmann, Ludger (ed.), 2011. "Industrial Policy for National Champions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026201601x, December.
    36. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    37. Mansueto Almeida, 2009. "Desafios da Real Política Industrial Brasileira do Século XXI," Discussion Papers 1452, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. de Menezes Barboza, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Gabriel F.R., 2019. "Measuring the aggregate effects of the Brazilian Development Bank on investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 223-236.
    2. Frigerio, Marco & Vandone, Daniela, 2020. "European development banks and the political cycle," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Marco Bonomo & Ricardo Brito & Bruno Martins, 2014. "Macroeconomic and Financial Consequences of the After Crisis Government-Driven Credit Expansion in Brazil," Working Papers Series 378, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    4. Saibal Ghosh, 2023. "Political connections and bank behaviour," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 52(1), February.
    5. Mikhail Mamonov & Anna Pestova & Steven Ongena, 2023. "“Crime and Punishment”? How Banks Anticipate and Propagate Global Financial Sanctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp753, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    6. Thanh Ngo & Jurica Susnjara, 2020. "Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(7-8), pages 1059-1085, July.
    7. Mariana Mazzucato & Caetano C.R. Penna, 2016. "Beyond market failures: the market creating and shaping roles of state investment banks," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 305-326, October.
    8. Bonomo, Marco & Brito, Ricardo D. & Martins, Bruno, 2015. "The after crisis government-driven credit expansion in Brazil: A firm level analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 111-134.
    9. Uwe Vollmer & Diemo Dietrich & Ralf bebenroth, 2009. "Behold the 'Behemoth'. The privatization of Japan Post Bank," Discussion Paper Series 236, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    10. Srinivasan, Anand & Thampy, Ashok, 2017. "The effect of relationships with government-owned banks on cash flow constraints: Evidence from India," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 361-373.
    11. Ding, Haoyuan & Hu, Yichuan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Xie, Mi, 2023. "Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    12. Qu Deng & Hezun Li & Hong Yue, 2024. "Public–private partnership, cost of debt and accounting conservatism," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 432-482, March.
    13. Nhung Hong Dao & Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty & Jing Shi & Monica Tan, 2020. "Institutional quality, investment efficiency, and the choice of public–private partnerships," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(2), pages 1801-1834, June.
    14. Gomes, Matheus da Costa & Valle, Mauricio Ribeiro do, 2023. "Do companies that benefit from development banks' funding invest more? New evidence from Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    15. Yan Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2012. "How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide," NBER Working Papers 17981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Doan, Anh-Tuan & Lin, Kun-Li & Doong, Shuh-Chyi, 2020. "State-controlled banks and income smoothing. Do politics matter?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    17. Randall Morck & M. Deniz Yavuz & Bernard Yeung, 2019. "State-Run Banks, Money Growth, and the Real Economy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5914-5932, December.
    18. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
    19. Mr. Jacques A Miniane & Ezequiel Cabezon & Mr. Sebastian Weber & Christine J. Richmond & Ms. Dora Benedek & Mr. James Roaf & Mr. Francisco J Parodi & Mr. Peter Dohlman & Rima Turk & Bobana Cegar & Mic, 2019. "Reassessing the Role of State-Owned Enterprises in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe," IMF Departmental Papers / Policy Papers 2019/010, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Quoc-Anh Do & Yen-Teik Lee & Bang Dang Nguyen, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections," Working Papers hal-03460972, HAL.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:66:y:2015:i:c:p:237-253. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.