Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?
AbstractSummary Of what relative importance are strategic motivators for bilateral aid donors, and how important is a recipient's geographic proximity to conflict relative to previously examined economic and political motivators? We find that donors have historically responded to balanced incentives to reduce recipient poverty and further donor political and economic goals. Every bilateral donor conditions aid on conflict. The United States allocates large amounts of development aid to countries bordering a conflict, both pre- and post-Cold War. However, controlling for development levels and donor economic and political interest, most donors reduce aid to a recipient with an in-house or nearby intense conflict.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.
Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
foreign aid conflict political economy bilateral aid donors developing countries;
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