Multiple tournaments and sustained defection: Why do negotiations fail to secure resource access between pastoral and agropastoral groups in Ethiopia?
AbstractThis article uses analytic narratives to explore the reasons why negotiations over rights to grazing resources repeatedly fail between neighboring pastoral and agropastoral communities. While many writers link resource scarcity, the resulting competition and state institutional failure as common drivers for conflict among multiple resource users in the semi-arid pastoral areas, the causes for violent conflict and the failure of local level negotiations between groups need to be explained in the framework of geopolitical context and the rent earned from perpetrating violence. This study reveals how economic incentives from livestock raids and the unrestricted access to conflict technology reinforce each other and jointly undermine the success of negotiations in producing favorable outcomes. The undesirable outcomes from negotiation failure can be expressed in terms of rent dissipation, rangeland resource degradation, increased instability and the potential for increased vulnerability and deterioration of agropastoral welfare.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 42 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Conflict; Common property; Negotiation; Livestock raids;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bogale, Ayalneh & Korf, Benedikt, 2005.
"To Share or Not to Share? (Non-) Violence, Scarcity and Resource Access in Somali Region, Ethiopia,"
Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Discussion Papers
18842, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Ayalneh Bogale & Benedikt Korf, 2007. "To share or not to share? (non-)violence, scarcity and resource access in Somali Region, Ethiopia," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 743-765.
- Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
- Arturo Escobar, 2006. "Difference and Conflict in the Struggle Over Natural Resources: A political ecology framework," Development, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 6-13, September.
- Robert H. Bates & Avner Greif & Margaret Levi & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1998. "Analytic Narratives," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 6355.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.