Perceived tax evasion and the importance of trust
AbstractUsing Swedish individual survey data, we analyze the perception of tax evasion in terms of ten different taxes. We find large variation across taxes, highlighting the importance of studying different taxes separately rather than treating tax evasion as one common phenomenon. We focus on the importance of trust in taxpayers and in politicians. Those who do not trust their fellow citizens are more likely to believe that they are evading taxes, but distrust in politicians has an even greater effect, especially for redistributive and fiscally motivated taxes. Hence, it is important for politicians to be perceived as trustworthy in order to be able to collect taxes for maintaining the welfare state.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal The Journal of Socio-Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Trust in politicians Generalized trust Social capital General welfare state Tax policy Tax compliance;
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