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Regulation of common property resources under private information about resource externalities

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  • Osmundsen, Petter

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 349-366

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Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:24:y:2002:i:4:p:349-366

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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  1. Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-49, August.
  2. Bulckaen, Fabrizio, 1997. "Emissions Charge and Asymmetric Information: Consistently a Problem?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 100-106, September.
  3. Osmundsen, P. & Hagen, K. P. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Internationally mobile firms and tax policy1," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-113, June.
  4. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
  5. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-77, August.
  6. Petter Osmundsen, 1998. "Dynamic Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources Under Asymmetric Information About Reserves," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 933-951, November.
  7. Trond E. Olsen, 1993. "Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 529-541, Winter.
  8. Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1998. "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," Papers 11/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-37, October.
  11. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, 2001. "Regulatory Remedies to the Common Pool: The Limits to Oil Field Unitization," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-26.
  12. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 819-847, Winter.
  13. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
  14. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  15. Osmundsen, Petter, 1996. "Repeated Auctions of Franchises for Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 183-89, September.
  16. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1988. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 986-98, December.
  17. Matthíasson, Thorolfur, 1992. "Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 210-231, May.
  18. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-87, June.
  19. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-30, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Cornelia Luchsinger & Adrian Müller, 2003. "Incentive Compatible Extraction of Natural Resource Rent," CEPE Working paper series 03-21, CEPE Center for Energy Policy and Economics, ETH Zurich.

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