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Dynamic Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources Under Asymmetric Information About Reserves

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Author Info
Petter Osmundsen

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Abstract

Optimal regulation is developed for a case with type-dependent dynamics in costs. In exploiting nonrenewable natural resources, a government faces the problem that extraction companies possess private information about the size of the reserves. Optimal contracts, in a two-period framework, distort both the extent and the pace of depletion. The regulatory optimum is implementable by a menu of tangent planes, generated by license fees and royalties, or by a corporate income tax system containing type-dependent depletion allowances and tax-exempted income levels. If the terminal time is endogenized, it is optimal also to distort the number of extraction periods.

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File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v31n4/12.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 933-951
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:4:p:933-951

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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008. "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation," Working Papers 960, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Helal, Uddin & Rahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur, 2006. "Optimal Contracts for Exploration with Cost Recovery of an Exhaustible Natural Resource Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 28578, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur & Helal, Uddin, 2004. "Optimal Contracts For Exploration With Cost Recovery Of An Exhaustible Natural Resource Under Asymmetric Information," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20180, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  4. Hung, N.M. & Poudou, J.-C. & Thomas, L., 2003. "Mining and Incentive Concession Contracts," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2003.08, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  5. repec:mop:credwp:03.10.38 is not listed on IDEAS
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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