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Language after liftoff: Fed communication away from the zero lower bound

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  • Feroli, Michael
  • Greenlaw, David
  • Hooper, Peter
  • Mishkin, Frederic S.
  • Sufi, Amir

Abstract

This paper examines the Federal Reserve's communication strategy to see how well it has worked and how it can be improved. It argues that Federal Reserve communication when short-term interest rates are no longer constrained by the zero lower bound should be focused on relaying a data-based reaction function which informs market participants how interest rates will adjust as new information arrives. Instead, the Federal Reserve in recent years has relied more heavily than desired on “time-based” forward guidance, focusing on when interest rates are likely to rise rather than under what circumstances. We argue that, except under unusual circumstances, this is an imprudent strategy, as it mutes the effect of macroeconomic news on interest rates and unnecessarily places restrictions on future Federal Reserve action when new information arrives. We argue that the Federal Reserve can improve communication in the current environment by moving away from time-based forward guidance, clarifying how interest rates are likely to change given new information, and providing more information in the Summary of Economic Projections.

Suggested Citation

  • Feroli, Michael & Greenlaw, David & Hooper, Peter & Mishkin, Frederic S. & Sufi, Amir, 2017. "Language after liftoff: Fed communication away from the zero lower bound," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 452-490.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:3:p:452-490
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2017.04.003
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    1. Dot-ology: What can we learn from the dot plot?
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2019-04-01 12:24:01

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    2. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Schaffer, Matthew, 2019. "Federal reserve private information and the stock market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 34-49.
    3. Haderer, Michaela, 2022. "An Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area with Expectations about the Timing and Nature of Liftoff from the Lower Bound," Working Papers 2022-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    4. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2017. "Making Discretion in Monetary Policy More Rule-Like," NBER Working Papers 24135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    6. Brent Bundick & Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, 2021. "From Deviations to Shortfalls: The Effects of the FOMC’s New Employment Objective," Research Working Paper RWP 21-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    7. Coenen, Günter & Montes-Galdón, Carlos & Saint Guilhem, Arthur & Hutchinson, John & Motto, Roberto, 2022. "Rate forward guidance in an environment of large central bank balance sheets: a Eurosystem stock-taking assessment," Occasional Paper Series 290, European Central Bank.
    8. Bhattarai, Saroj & Chatterjee, Arpita & Park, Woong Yong, 2020. "Global spillover effects of US uncertainty," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 71-89.
    9. Dr. Enzo Rossi & Vincent Wolff, 2020. "Spillovers to exchange rates from monetary and macroeconomic communications events," Working Papers 2020-18, Swiss National Bank.
    10. Cecchetti, Stephen & Schoenholtz, Kermit L., 2019. "Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications," CEPR Discussion Papers 13915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Parra-Polania Julian A., 2019. "State-Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 1019-1027, December.
    12. Emre Örün, 2020. "Theoritical Seekings in Macroeconomics," Istanbul Journal of Economics-Istanbul Iktisat Dergisi, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 70(2), pages 451-477, December.
    13. Cecchetti, Stephen & Feroli, Michael & Kashyap, Anil & Mann, Catherine L. & Schoenholtz, Kermit L., 2020. "Monetary Policy in the Next Recession?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15365, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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